Study asks what wins Palestinian hearts, minds

By Seth Mandel

August 1, 2008

A unique new study casts some doubt on the conventional wisdom vis-a-vis the correlation between Palestinian fatalities and the radicalization and political affiliation of Palestinian society.

The study, by four authors for the National Bureau of Economic Research, is called The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada, and reaches a conclusion that may surprise readers.

"We find that the average member of the Palestinian population holds more radical positions immediately after the occurrence of a Palestinian fatality in their district of residence," the authors conclude. "This effect is temporary, however, and vanishes completely within 90 days."

Using micro data and statistical analysis, the paper deviates from the more presumptuous studies of its kind, and concentrates on reading the empirical evidence. (Indeed, there is a chapter explaining the process, complete with complex mathematical equations and compact specifications.)

The authors are Esteban Klor and Sami H. Miaari, of the Department of Economics at Hebrew University in Mount Scopus, Jerusalem; David A. Jaeger, of the Department of Economics at the College of William and Mary, in Williamsburg, Va.; and M. Daniele Paserman, of the Department of Economics at Boston University, in Boston, Mass.

The background

The study opens with the reason such studies are necessary and must be accurate: modern conflicts, especially that between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, "are largely psychological. Public opinion plays a crucial role in such conflicts, to the point that most of the battles are conducted through the news media."

Even conventional attacks are often conducted with an ulterior psychological motive behind them, more than simply defeating the enemy on the battlefield, the authors note. For this reason, the authors suggest, the claim that Palestinians are hardened and radicalized by fatalities at the hands of the Israeli military must be examined carefully, because the implications of its conclusions are significant.

The authors combined daily data on fatalities from the beginning of the second Intifada in September of 2000 through February of 2007 with survey data gauging Palestinian preferences for party affiliation and the peace process.

The behavioral responses to fatalities 

The numbers show that within one month of a Palestinian fatality, Fatah, the party once chaired by Yasser Arafat and now Mahmoud Abbas and considered the more "moderate" party, loses support from the Palestinian public. Additionally, as support drains from Fatah, support drains from peace negotiations with Israel.

But this radicalization, possibly fueled by resentment rather than clear-headed political analysis, quickly begins to dissolve, and disappears entirely after 90 days.

The data also show that although Fatah loses support, the more extreme Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) do not gain those supporters. Rather, the public becomes disaffected with the political process -- in effect, waiting for Fatah to win that support back.

There is also the bidding-war effect. "When Hamas claims responsibility for Israeli fatalities, public support for it increases while support for the PIJ decreases," the report states. "Similarly, when the PIJ claims Israeli fatalities, public support for Hamas decreases. On the other hand, we find no evidence that Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas affect the relative support for Fatah, nor vice versa."

Targeting killings have a less pronounced version of the same effect, the report finds, and those expected to be a priori more radical show a larger shift away from moderate positions after a fatality.

The data

The data are culled from surveys conducted by the Development Studies Program at Bir Zeit University, about four-and-a-half miles from Ramallah. The polls contain information on the gender, age, marital status, education level, refugee status, type of residence (the polls distinguish between living in a town and living in a refugee camp), and the district of residence of each poll respondent.

In 12 polls, an average of 59.6 percent of Palestinians supported peace negotiations with Israel, while 36.9 percent opposed negotiations (the remainder provided no answer to the question). Among supporters of Fatah, 72 percent support peace negotiations, while 48 percent of Hamas supporters are in favor of negotiations with the Israelis. Intuitively, Palestinians that claim to be dissatisfied with the existing political factions are, on average, more radical than Fatah but more moderate than Hamas.

The data was compared (and corroborated by) public opinion polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC).

Here is the summary of the data on Fatah supporters throughout the polling time period: "The average support for Fatah falls from an initial level of about 30 percent at the end of the year 2000 to about 20 percent after the first year of the Intifada, then rises back slowly to its initial level between 2002 and 2004, jumps abruptly in late 2004 after the death of Yasser Arafat, and then steadily declines. The fraction of Palestinians supporting negotiations with Israel presents a more erratic trend, even though qualitatively the pattern of peaks and troughs roughly matches the one observed for the Fatah support series."

Fatalities

The data on fatalities are taken from a comprehensive list available from the human rights organization B'Tselem. The information includes the date, location, and circumstances of the fatal wounding and death, the age, gender, and residence of the victim, and whether the victim was a civilian.

For Palestinian fatalities, the district of the victim is recorded; for Israeli fatalities, the district of the Palestinian responsible for that death is recorded. An average Palestinian district, according to the report, suffered about 9.3 Palestinian fatalities and claimed about 2.4 Israeli fatalities during the study period.

Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron are the most violent Palestinian districts in the West Bank, according to the statistics.

Let the bidding begin

What is a supporter of Hamas like, as compared to a supporter of Fatah? Or one of the lesser-known factions?

According to the data, "there are no clear and striking differences between Fatah and Hamas supporters regarding areas and types of residency, refugee status, marital status, and age. Females, however, show a greater tendency to support Hamas relative to males, perhaps because of the greater degree of social services that Hamas provides."

That seems to indicate strongly that some are willing to support Hamas because Fatah (or one of the lesser factions) has been outbid, either by Hamas showing that it can: (A) kill more Israelis, either in retaliation or provocation, or (B) provide services that others cannot. The ability to buy support is, naturally, an advantage to the wealthier faction.

Additionally, the report finds that supporters of Fatah will remain so regardless of level of education, but this is not the case for the other factions. Hamas, for example, loses support among the college-or-higher educated Palestinians. That support does not necessarily go to Fatah, but the fact that it does bleed from Hamas would seem to support the "education is key" mode of thought.

"Overall, our results support the notion that Palestinian fatalities generate a short-run radicalization of the Palestinian population," the report states. "This effect completely dissipates over time."

But about Israeli fatalities?

The study finds that Israeli fatalities embolden residents of the Gaza Strip, at least immediately afterwards. But it does have a strong effect on negotiations: "Whereas this radicalization effect dissipates over time in terms of the support for Fatah, the overall effect of Israeli fatalities leads to a statistically significant decrease in the support for peace negotiations of residents of the Gaza Strip."

That would seem to support the notion that Israeli security is paramount to successful negotiations -- Israelis may be less inclined to negotiate with terrorists, but the statistics show those terrorists (at least those in Gaza) also are less likely to negotiate if they are able to kill Israelis.

In terms of Israeli retaliation for such terrorism, the data show that not only are Israeli deaths usually reduced after Israeli targeted assassinations of key Palestinian players, but those targeted killings are also far less likely to cause any shift in Palestinian political support or cause any increase in radicalization.

The data, therefore, would seem to support an Israeli policy of strong defense and targeted assassinations as the combination most likely to safeguard the public's desire for peace negotiations.

Conclusions

In sum, the report finds that the "outbidding" process is one in which Fatah does not participate. In other words, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad often compete over the violence each can perpetrate on the Israeli population, and are successful in persuading each other's followers to switch sides with the promise of spilling more Israeli blood. Fatah supporters, however, cannot be won over in such a manner.

Also, moderate Palestinians' default party affiliation seems to be Fatah, and while many will express dissatisfaction with Fatah, they will not join the other, more extreme factions. Instead, they will -- within 90 days, often less -- return to Fatah and reaffirm their support for negotiations.

This data, when combined with the data on education and the effect of Israeli fatalities and retaliation, would seem to support a focus on education, security, and targeted assassinations. But it would also seem to be an implied endorsement of Fatah, and perhaps a warning against the abandonment of Israeli and Western support for Fatah, as well as provide a strong argument against equating Fatah, and more critically its supporters, with those of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or any of the other, more extreme, factions.