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When King Charles I of Sicily endeavored to invade Constantinople in 1282 to expand his kingdom to include the Byzantine-Roman capital, he found his own capital was quickly lost to a seemingly spontaneous revolt.

The Sicilian revolt, however, was not a surprise to Byzantine emperor Michael VIII -- he helped plan it. The crisis in Sicily forced Charles to turn back from his assault on Constantinople. The Byzantine empire survived for almost another 200 years.

As recalled in great detail by the historian Edward N. Luttwak in "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire," this move was one example of the strategic brilliance employed by the Byzantine empire -- the term by which the eastern half of the Roman Empire is known after the split in 395.

The western half of the empire was thought to be the more secure and prosperous, the eastern was thought to be the raw end of the split. Yet the western half didn't last a century, while the Byzantine half -- through maneuvering like the above account of the Byzantine emperor fomenting foreign revolts -- survived for more than 1,000 years.

The lessons in this story, however, are irrelevant if you don't recognize the need for such strategy. This is the case with Russia, currently reprising the role of the Byzantines while forgetting their lines.

Like the Byzantine empire, Russia's power stems in part from rich natural resources -- in Russia's case oil and gas. Like the Byzantines, Russia is threatened by a resurgent Persian Gulf power -- today, Iran and their Arab terror clients -- whose power Russia also must co-opt to battle other enemies (Europe, the U.S.). Like the Byzantines, Russia must deal with trouble on its Caucasian borderlands.

Russia even fancies itself heir to the Byzantine empire. Walter Laqueur, in a paper for a Harvard University series on the Middle East, notes that "there is the feeling of superiority, the view of Russia as the Third Rome possessed of a unique mission in the world."

Unfortunately, Russia's main enemy, both within and without, is not getting the attention it warrants.

As Laqueur points out, "it could be said that Russia's historical misfortune (and fate) are its obsession with imaginary dangers and neglect of real ones."

Where are these real dangers, and in what numbers?

"Estimates of their number vary greatly -- between 1.5 and 2 million -- but walking the Moscow street their massive presence is unmistakable," Laqueur writes. "Whole quarters of the capital have been taken over by them, such as Butovo in the far south, but also regions near the big official and unofficial markets."

Ominous. They've got a hold on the capital. But they've also got a hold on the border regions, as well as the armed forces. This internal enemy was even the subject of a report by Finland's Defense Ministry, which warns, according to a Finnish national newspaper, that demographics in Russia are "changing the essential character of the Russian population."

Who's this enemy? What will the new Russian character be? British writer Ashley Mote lays out the crux of the Finnish report.

"If demographic growth continues in the same way, by 2015 the majority of Russian army conscripts will be Muslims," Mote writes. "Five years later 20% of all Russians will be Muslims. By mid-century, a majority of the Russian population will be Muslim."

A nuclear Muslim country with radical Islamist regions across the Caspian Sea from an Islamist country currently seeking nuclear weapons. According to current trends, in 40 years that's what Russia will be. With more than 6-and-a-half million square miles (and 11 times zones to boot), Russia is the largest country in the world. It has the world's largest proven natural gas reserves and eighth largest proven oil reserves.

Aside from Muscovite turmoil, Russia's walls are closing in. Here's Laqueur again: "No solution seems to be in sight for stabilizing the situation in northern Caucasus, partly because of the continuing attacks of the jihadists, but also because there seems to be an inherent, traditional inclination towards long wars in the region.... Now the Islamists may believe that if they could only succeed in defeating Russia militarily and expelling the Russian civilians, they might impose their own pax Islamica on the region."

Has the politically correct ban on the term "war on terror" expired yet?

Luttwak writes that the "arts of persuasion" and "superior information" -- what we call diplomacy and intelligence -- were indispensable in saving the Byzantine empire. It's high time we twist Putin's arm, and in return give him the intelligence and other cooperation he needs to gain the upper hand on Russia's internal Islamist threat.

That means the doves have to get over their opposition to missile defense in Russia's near abroad and their enthusiasm for the current nuclear reduction regime, which merely finances Russia's other weapons programs. It also means the Cold War hawks have to get over their knee-jerk resistance to anything that consolidates Russian power.

Unless, of course, the Russian bear in a burqa doesn't bother you.

Seth Mandel is the managing editor of The Jewish State.