Report lays out military action against Iran

By Seth Mandel

July 4, 2008

Emphasized by the administration of President George W. Bush and echoed by a great number of public officials, pundits, newspaper editorial boards, and strategists has been the now-familiar refrain: if the Iranians continue their push toward nuclear capability, we cannot take the military option off the table.

Though considered by most to be the last resort, military action against Iran's nuclear program may nonetheless be necessary, and both the United States and Israel have indicated that preparations for such an attack are underway, just in case.

But what would happen if such action were taken? Titled "The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action against Iran," Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy present the findings of their comprehensive study of the possible scenarios. Clawson is a deputy director for research at the institute, and Eisenstadt is a senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the institute; the report is available on the institute's Web site, www.washingtoninstitute.org.

Secret, enigmatic, or outright undeniable

There are three types of preventive action, according to the authors: Covert action, strikes on clandestine facilities, and a more comprehensive strike. 

Covert action, such as encouraging the defection of key engineers or leading scientists, or sabotage, such as introducing design flaws into the equipment or infecting related computer systems with a virus, would leave the Iranian leadership confused and suspicious but without a smoking gun. The authors point out that such action, by its nature, would be least likely to provoke retaliation.

But covert action would require access to the facilities and sustained efforts over time. "Because of these difficulties, covert action would probably not have a broad, long-term effect on Iran's nuclear program or obviate the need for military action," the authors write.

A strike on clandestine facilities (assuming their existence) would be modeled after the successful Israeli strike on a joint Syrian-North Korean nuclear facility at Dayr az-Zawr in the Syrian desert in September, the authors note. The attack was a political success as well, because Syria was hamstrung in its reaction by the very fact that it couldn't afford to confirm the target, and its Arab neighbors confirmed Syria's isolation by not responding to the attack on Syria's behalf.

But can the efficacy of such action be guaranteed in the case of Iran? The authors are doubtful: "Iran has large declared facilities that could produce the fissile material for a nuclear weapon without relying on clandestine facilities," they state. "Therefore, if the United States or Israel were to hit Iran's nuclear infrastructure, they would have to hit not only possible clandestine facilities, but also parts of Iran's now overt nuclear infrastructure that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program."

But a more comprehensive strike may be necessary, the authors note, for two reasons:

• Important parts of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure may survive the initial attack.
  
  
• The facilities at Bushehr (reactor) and Esfahan (conversion) are near population centers, and the U.S. and Israel may need to head off an Iranian retaliatory attack.

On the second note, the authors suggest an ancillary strike on Iran's navy, inventory of military aircraft, or missile and rocket capabilities.

The Iranian response

The authors tackle each possible Iranian response, from the diplomatic through most violent expression of intended revenge -- though the choices are not mutually exclusive.

First, the authors suggest a possible Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They write that Iran, under article X of the treaty, could claim its right to withdraw from the NPT if it were attacked for pursuing uranium enrichment for purposes it claimed were peaceful. However, such a move would not only undercut Iran's post-attack efforts to garner international sympathy, it would also make it difficult for Iran to rebuild its nuclear program since the country would no longer be eligible to obtain any enrichment-related materiel from treaty signatories.

The second response option would be to disrupt regional oil exports. Iran could, for example, effect a naval blockade of the Gulf. It could not, the authors note, do so for long, since tankers are difficult to sink and could bypass sunken ships in the Strait of Hormuz, and sea mines could be swept. All that, however, could take up to a month, disrupting oil shipping for that period of time. But, the authors point out, blocking the strait would be self-defeating for the Iranians.

"Attempting to close the strait would harm Iran at least as much as it would harm any of its adversaries, because Tehran presently has no other way to bring to market its oil (which accounts for 80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings)," the authors write. Such action would also invite retaliation against Iran's own oil production and shipping infrastructure. Iran last attacked neutral navigation routes in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, prompting foreign military action by the U.S. and Europe. Yet, the authors note, it would be "prudent" for the U.S. to prepare for just such a blockade, since Iran has a history of making good on its threats to block the strait.

The authors write that the U.S. could position itself to respond immediately to such a blockade, and could arrange for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, for example) to "expand the capacity of pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz," such as the Saudis' Petroline to the Red Sea coast and a pipeline in production between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Gulf of Oman. Similarly, if Iran halted oil exports, other major oil exporters could simply step up their production.

The next step up would be an attack on U.S. and allied assets in the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil processing facility -- the largest in the world. However, the authors note, al-Qaeda beat Iran to it, in 2006. Since then, security at all Saudi oil facilities has been improved.

Iran could instead choose to attack water desalination plants on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, which, according to the authors, provide more than 60 percent of the drinking water used by Gulf Arab states. To prevent such an attack, the authors suggest linking the water systems of GCC nations so an attack on one plant could be offset.

Of course, the authors suggest, bringing GCC nations into the war would be an unwise move for Iran, as would an attack on the nearby U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet (which would respond by destroying Iran's navy, for starters).

Iran could respond by attacking U.S. interests in Iraq, the authors continue. Iran is already notoriously funding and training anti-coalition Shiite forces, offering aid and supplies to Sunni groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, and providing the components of improvised explosive devices (IED) and shoulder-launched antiaircraft weapons to anti-coalition fighters. Stepping up anti-American attacks in Iraq would be indirect, however, and coalition forces would likely be ready for the increased smuggling activity.

Another option would be for Iran to engineer a flurry of rocket attacks from southern Lebanon aimed at population centers in northern Israel, through its proxy terrorist group Hezbollah. In doing so, the authors write, Iran would be "harming a key U.S. ally, scoring points on the Arab street, and undermining efforts to revive Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy."

The authors add that Hezbollah now holds an estimated 30,000 Iranian rockets for that purpose, and Hezbollah is a crucial feature of Iran's deterrence assets. The downside to such action, the authors note, would be a dramatic loss in public acceptance of Hezbollah's stated mission and disapproval of its invitation to Israel to respond. The U.S., the authors write, may attempt to head off such action by indicating that it would support a heavy response by Israel's military, and "accelerate cooperation with Israel on the development and deployment of systems to defend against short-range rockets."

Iran could initiate a missile attack on Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona, as did Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991. The Iraq missile missed, however, and anyway the authors were skeptical of the damage it would have done even if it had hit its mark. "Israel," the authors state, "has presumably taken steps to protect Dimona" since then.

Though Iran cannot, militarily, find itself on fair footing in taking on the United States, it can use terrorism as an equalizer. The authors put this near the top of the list of violent responses to an attack on Iran's nuclear program. "Iran might sponsor terrorism in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE -- all of which host important U.S. military facilities -- to sow fear among the Arab Gulf states and cause them to curb or deny U.S. access to military facilities in the Gulf," they state. With the Iranian regime's assistance to al-Qaeda and its control of Hezbollah, the U.S. would, the authors write, be vulnerable virtually anywhere in the world to Iran-funded terror campaigns.

Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to rein in, and protect its interests from, Iranian terror squads would likely be stepped up noticeably in such a case, the authors add.

Lastly, the authors present the possibility of preventive strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure escalating into a full-scale war.

But even this, the authors note, is unlikely to draw a U.S. ground invasion of Iran. "Although as part of a preventive strike, the United States might attack the Iranian military to limit Iran's ability to retaliate, standoff attacks could, in a matter of weeks, destroy all major elements of Iran's conventional military forces," they state.

Although the authors concede that in the course of preventive action U.S. ground forces may "unwisely" seize oil platforms or islands in the Gulf to head off their use by the Iranian military, "anything beyond that is most unlikely."

Iran, the authors note, has triple the population of Iraq and four times the land mass, making a military occupation by outside forces extremely impractical. Such an occupation would be made all the more untenable, the authors state, by even a limited ground defense by Iranian soldiers.

"More likely, a conflict would settle down after several weeks of high-intensity military operations into a protracted, low-intensity conflict, involving terrorist attacks by Iranian agents or surrogates against U.S. interests around the world, and U.S. retaliatory actions against Iran," the authors conclude. "Even such a limited war scenario, however, would involve numerous challenges and complications for U.S. military planners and policymakers."

What would success look like?

The authors peer into post-strike analysis, dissecting the perception of success. They posit that too much discussion about the value of preventive action is centered on the amount of destruction wreaked on Iran's nuclear program. "That may ultimately matter less than whether or not Iran decides to rebuild," they offer.

Any action that convinced Iran that it would be too risky and too costly to continue its pursuit of proliferation would be successful, they write, regardless of the amount of camera-friendly, headline grabbing physical destruction. Even if epic landscapes of concrete ruins, dust clouds rising, and sand swirling don't appear following the strikes, the U.S. may have still landed its knockout punch.

"Either way, preventive military action would, by necessity, be a prelude to further action: multilateral diplomacy to press Iran not to rebuild, or additional military strikes after the infrastructure was rebuilt," the authors write. They point out that the preventive action taken could be judged as much on how it facilitates further action, especially diplomatic cleanup.

The authors write that the U.S. should not expect, and anyway would not seek, assistance from Iran's neighbors (even friendly ones, such as Iraq and Jordan) because of the Arab street's visceral opposition to publicly assisting interlopers.

On this point, Eisenstadt was asked by The Jewish State whether this includes permission to use any of these countries' airspace. Eisenstadt responded that unlike Israel, the U.S. could reach its Iranian targets without flying over regional states.

"The U.S. has a greater number of options than Israel: U.S. B-2 Stealth Bomber aircraft can fly from bases in the U.S. or the region (say Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean -- though I believe the U.S. would need British approval for the use of Diego) and approach Iran from the south -- the Persian Gulf -- without overflying any regional states, and penetrate Iranian airspace undetected," Eisenstadt wrote in an email to The Jewish State. 

Eisenstadt noted that in 2003, U.S. bombers took off from the continental U.S., hit their targets in Iraq, and returned to our shores. The planes refueled en route several times, he said, and likely had overflight permission from regional states.

"This time, I'm not sure we would get overflight rights, so it might be more difficult to do, but it could be done," he said. "Israel, by contrast, doesn't have that kind of global strike capability, and they would almost certainly have to overfly neighboring countries en route to Iran, due to range and refueling limitations of their aircraft.  So hitting Iran would be a much more difficult and risky proposition for Israel."

Eisenstadt and Clawson warn that any use of force should have perceived legitimacy among the American public and the nation's allies, otherwise it could exacerbate tensions and give Tehran's weaponization its own legitimacy, as well as sympathy.

But central to that discussion is an understanding of the necessity of the preventive measures; even if it is the "last resort," the authors state, the sincerity of its inclusion as an option will strengthen the diplomacy and other nonmilitary options that precede it.