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The author of "National Minority, Regional Majority: Palestinian Arabs Versus Jews in Israel" (Syracuse University Press, 2009), Yitzhak Reiter, has an impressive background. He teaches at the Conflict Studies Program of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science of Ashkelon Academic College. Reiter served as the Deputy Advisor on Arab Affairs between 1978 and 1986 to three Israeli prime ministers. He is very involved in Jewish-Arab dialogue inside Israel. Reiter believes that the conflict between the Arab minority in Israel and the Jewish majority should be seen as an extension of the larger conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The Land Day protests of March 30, 1976, marked a major turning point in the relationship between Israel and her Arab citizens.

This act of civil disobedience in response to Israel's decision to expropriate thousands of dunams of land for "security and settlement purposes," shocked every segment of the Jewish population. No one had foreseen that Arab citizens would engage in such violent and physical confrontation with the security forces.

Dealing with the increasing radicalization of the Arab minority is a concern of the government. In particular, the Israelis are determined to preserve the Jewish majority of the state, populate Jews in the Galilee, the Negev, and the Triangle (in the eastern Sharon plain among the Samarian foothills) where Arabs dominate, and ensure the Jewish nature of the state in the public arena.

Until the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, the Jews were hardly ever directly involved with Arab citizens in open conflict. When the protests turned into an insurrection, the "Jewish public retaliated against the Arab minority." Reiter sees this response in terms of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict rather than being related to the minority status of the Israeli Arabs.

Interestingly, Reiter found that the Arab leadership is more extremist and militant than their constituents, yet the public actively participates in protests and riots. Since the 1970s, the Arabs have disappointed in not being able to integrate into Israeli society and to establish a Palestinian state in pre-1967 borders. They now want a change in the state.

In The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, issued in December 2006, but not distributed extensively until January 2007, by the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel and endorsed by the Supreme Follow-Up Committee of the Arabs in Israel, a group of 40 leading Arab intellectuals and activists who authored the report, admonish Israel for having "transformed us into a minority living in our own historic homeland."

In its place, they demand a "fully active" role in a "consensual democracy" to guarantee complete equality in Israeli political, social, and economic life. The Israeli flag, the Law of Return, the national anthem, land ownership, and religious and language practices would have to be revised to ensure parity. Some Arab leaders advocate forming their own representative institutions and boycotting Israeli elections.

Reiter notes that one cannot underestimate the connection between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a political resource. The Arab and Islamic world "are their strategic depth." Increased international appreciation and concern for human and minority rights, as well as ethnic conflicts "further empower" the Arab minority.

There is a general increase in hostility between the Jews and Arabs in Israel, with Jews rarely resorting to violence. Since 1967, Arab Palestinian and national identity has intensified, resulting in their assuming more radicalized attitudes and strategies toward the Jewish state. Yet, Reiter concludes that this debate over historical narrative, the nature of the state, land, civic, and national identity are the continuation of the 100-year dispute between the Zionists and the Arabs.

He faults the government for the dramatic change in Arab behavior, which has pushed them to identify with the Arab majority in the Middle East. This allows them to cope psychologically with the "their siege mentality."

Among Reiter's solutions: improve the rights and status of the Arab minority and solve the Arab/Palestinian issue, which would decrease their resentment of Israel.

Expanding the rights of the Israeli Arabs might ease some tension, but not resolve their ultimate goal of achieving absolute equality in Israeli political, social, and economic life.

Reiter's suggestion that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict would also help the situation is equally problematic. The implication is that this is within Israel's capabilities alone. Yet, nothing suggests that the Palestinian Arabs want anything other than the demise of the Jewish state. This is what their covenants and charters state, their imam's preach, their politicians and media espouse, and educational system teaches.

With these concerns in mind, this is still an important study and well worth reading.

Dr. Alex Grobman is a Hebrew University trained historian. He is the author of a number of books, including "Nations United: How The U.N. Undermines Israel and The West," "Denying History: Who Says The Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It?" and a forthcoming book on Israel's moral and legal right to exist as a Jewish state.